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434 PEOPLE tI. CAHAN [44 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5670. In Bank. Apr. 2f, 1955.] 
"iHE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CHARLES H. CAHAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures - Use of Dictographs. - Pen. Code, 
§ 653h, uuthorizing use and installation of dictographs by 
peace officers in certain cases, does not and cannot authorize 
violations of constitutional provisions relating to search and 
seizure. 
[2] Id.-Applicability of Federal Oonstitutional Provisions.-AI-
though U. S. Const., 4th Amendment, relating to unreasonable 
searches and seizures, applies only to federal government, 
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by police. 
which is at core of such amendment, is basic to a free society, 
is implicit in concept of ordered liberty, and as such is en-
forceable against states through due process clause of 14th 
Amendment. 
[3] 
.1[4] 
[6] 
[6] 
Id.-Guarantee of Privacy.-Iwportant as efficient law en-
forcement may be, it is more important that right of privacy 
guaranfeed by U. S. Const., 4tb Amendment, relating to un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, 
guaranteeing personal privacy, be respected . 
Id.-Justification for.-Since in no case shall right of people 
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures be 
violated, contention that unreasonable searches and seizures 
are justified by necessity of bringing criminals to justice can-
not be accepted, and guilty and innocent alike should be 
secure from unreasonable police intrusions. 
Id.-Justification for.-Provisions of U. S. Const., 4th Amend-
ment, relating to unreasonable searches and seizures, and Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 19, guaranteeing personal privacy, make no 
distinction between guilty and innocent, and it would be im-
possible to protect rights of innocent if police were permitted 
to justify unreasonable searches and seizures on ground that 
they assumed their victims were criminals. 
Oriminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Fcderal rule that guarantee of U. S. Const., 4th 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[6] Admissibility of evidence obtained by' illegal search and 
seizure, notes, 24 A.L.R. 1408; 32 A.L.R. 408; 41 A.L.R. 1145: 
52 A.L.R. 477; 88 A.L.R. 348; 150 A.L.R. 566. See also Oa1.Jur.2d. 
Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Searches and Seizures, i 1; [6-9] 
Criminal Law, § 410. 
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Amendment, relating to unreasonable searches and seizures, 
applies to states' through 14th Amendment does not require 
states that have heretofore admitted illegally seized evidence 
to exclude it now; such exclusionary rule is not essential in-
gredient of right of privacy guaranteed by 4th Amendment, 
but simply means of enforcing that right, which states can 
accept or reject. 
['1] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained hy Unlawful Seizure.- V 
Evidencp obtained in violation ()' . ,( i tu tional guarantees 
against unreasonable searches alit: ' ... cclres is inadmissible. 
(Overruling People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517]; 
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435,24 A.L.R. 1383], and 
cases based thereon.) 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-A 
system that permits prosecution to trust habitually to use of 
illegally obtained evidence cannot help but encourage viola-
tions of Constitution at expense of lawful means of enforcing 
law. 
[9] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-In ../" 
developing rule of evidence applicable in state courts, such 
as federal rule excluding evidence obtained by unlawful search 
and seizure, Supreme Court is not bound by decisions that have 
applied federal rule but may reject them if they have de-
veloped needless refinements and distinctions or if federal 
cases indicate needless limitations on right to conduct reason-
able searches and seizures or to secure warrants. 
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TRA YNOR, J .-Defendant and 15 other persons were 
'charged with conspiring to engage in horse-race bookmaking 
and related offenses in violation of section 337a of the Penal 
Code. Six of the defendants pleaded guilty. After a trial 
without a jury, the court found one defendant not guilty 
and each of the other defendants guilty as charged. Charles 
H. Cahan, one of the defendants found guilty, was granted 
probation for a period of five years on the condition that he 
spend the first 90 days of his probationary period in the 
county jail and pay a $2,000 fine. He appeals from the 
order granting him probation and the order denying his mo-
tion for a new trial. 
Most of the incriminatory evidence introduced at the trial 
was obtained by officers of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment in flagrant violation of the United States Constitution 
(4th and 14th Amendments), the California Constitution 
(art. I, § 19), and state and federal statutes. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 146, 602; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 242; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.) 
Gerald Wooters, an officer attached to the intelligence unit 
of that department testified that after securing the permission 
of the chief of police to make microphone installations· at 
two places occupied by defendants, he, Sergeant Keeler, and 
Officer Phillips one night at about 8 :45 entered one "house 
through the side window of the first floor," and that he 
"directed the officers to place a listening device under a chest 
of drawers." Another officer made recordings and tran-
scriptions of the conversations that came over wires from the 
listening device to receiving equipment installed in a nearby 
garage. About a month later, at Officer Wooters' direction, 
"Section 653h of the Penal Code provides: ' 'An~ person wilo, with-
out consent of the owner, lessee, or occupant, installs or attempts to in-
stall or use a dictogra.ph in any house, room, apartment, tenement, office, 
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, or other building, tent, vessel, 
railroad car, vehicle, mine or any underground portion thereof, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor; provided, that nothing herein shall prevent the use 
and installation of dictographs by a regular salaried police officer ex-
pressly authorized thereto by the head of his office or department or by a 
district attorney when Buch use and installation are necessary in the per-
formance of their duties in detecting crime and ill the appreheDBion of 
erilniPlle " 
\ 
J 
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a similar device was surreptitiously installed in another house 
and receiving equipment was also set up in a nearby garage. 
Such methods of getting evidence have been caustically cen-
sured by the United States Supreme Court: "That officers 
of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device, 
even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversations of the oc-
cupants for over a month would be almost incredible if it 
were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our 
attention that more flagrantly, deliberately and persistently 
violate the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth 
Amendment .... " (Irvine v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128, 132 
[74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].) [1] Section 653h of the Penal 
Code does not and could not authorize violations of the Con-
stitution, and the proviso under which the officers purported 
to act at most prevents their conduct from constituting a 
violation of that section itself. 
The evidence obtained from the microphones was not the 
only unconstitutionally obtained evidence introdUCed at the 
trial over defendants' objection. In addition there was a 
mass of evidence obtained by numerous forcible entries and 
seizures without search warrants. 
The forcible entries and seizures were candidly admitted 
by the various officers. For example, Officer Fosnocht identi-
fied the evidence that he seized, and testified as to his means 
of entry: " .•. and how did you gain entrance to the par-
ticular place' I forced entry through the front door and 
. Officer Farquarson through the rear door. You say you 
forced the front door T • • • Yes. And how T I kicked it open 
with my foot. • . ." Officer Schlocker testified that he entered 
the place where he seized evidence "through a window lo-
cated I believe it was west of the front door .... [W]hen 
you tried to force entry in other words, you tried to knock 
it [the door ] down is that right ? We tried to knock it 
down, yes, sir. What with T A shoe, foot. Kick it T Tried 
to kick it in, yes. And then you moved over and broke the 
window to gain entrance, is that right Y We did." Officer 
Scherrer testified that he gained entry into one of the places 
where he seized evidence by kicking the front door in. He 
also entered another place, accompanied by Officers Hilton 
and Horral, by breaking through a window. Officer Harris 
"just walked up and kicl{ed the door in" to gain entry to 
the place assigned to him. 
Thus, without fear of criminal punishment or other 
discipline, law enforcement officers, sworn to support the 
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Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
California, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in 
violation of both Constitutions and the laws enacted there-
under. It is clearly apparent from their testimony that 
they casually regard such acts as nothing more than the 
performance of their ordinary duties for which the city 
empt'oys and pays them. 
[2] The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
Although this amendment, like each of the other provisions 
of the original Bill of Rights, applies only to the federal 
government (Barron v. Balt-imore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243 [8 L.Ed. 
672] ; Adamson v. Oal';,fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 51 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 
91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223]), '[t]he security of one's 
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is 
at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free 
society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered 
liberty' [Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (58 
S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288)] and as such enforceable against 
the States through the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.]" (Wolf v. Oolorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 [69 
S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782].) An essentially identical guar-
antee of personal privacy is set forth in article I, section 19 
of the California Constitution. 
[3] Thus both the United States Constitution and the 
California Constitution make it emphatically clear that im-
portant as efficient law enforcement may be, it is more 
important that the right of privacy guaranteed by these 
constitutional provisions be respected. [4] Since in no case 
shall the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures be violated, the contention that un-
reasonable searches and seizures are justified by the necessity 
of bringing criminals to justice cannot be accepted. It was 
rejected when the constitutional provisions were adopted 
and the choice was made that all the people, guilty and 
innocent alike, should be secure from unreasonable police 
intrusions, even though some criminals should escape.-
.,' Of course, this like each of our constitutional guarantees often ma7 
afford a shelter for criminals. But the forefathers thought this waa DOl 
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[5] Moreover, the constitutional provisions make no distinc-
tion between the guilty and the innocent, and it would be 
manifestly impossible to protect the rights of the innocent 
if the police were permitted to justify unreasonable searches 
and seizures on the ground that they assumed their victims 
were criminals. Thus, when consideration is directed to the 
question of the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation 
of the constitutional provisions, it bears emphasis that the 
court is not concerned solely with the rights of the defendant 
before it, however guilty he may appear, but with the con-
stitutional right of all of the people to be secure in their 
homes, persons, and effects. 
The constitutional provisions themselves do not expressly 
answer the question whether eVidence obtained in violation 
thereof is admissible in criminal actions. Neither Congress 
nor the Legislature has given an answer, and the courts of 
the country are divided on the question. The federal courts 
and those of some of the states· exclude such evidence. 
(Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 [34 8.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 
652, L.R.A. 1915B 834]; McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451 [69 8.0t. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] ; see state cases collected 
in Appendix to Wolf v. Oolomdo, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39.) 
In accord with the traditional common-law rule (see Mc-
Cormick on Evidence, p, 296), the courts of a maj9rity of 
the states admit it (see cases collected in Appendix to W oll 
v. Oolorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39), and heretofore the 
.courts of this state have admitted it. (People v. Le Doux, 
155 Oal. 535, 547 [102 P. 517] ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 
237, 242-253 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383] ; People v. Gonzales, 
20 Oa1.2d 165, 169 [124 P.2d 44] ; People v. ](elley, 22 Ca1.2d 
169, 172 [137 P.2d 1].) 
[6] The decision of the United States Supreme Oourt in 
Wolf v. Oolorado that the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment 
too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers, and 
effects which is indispensable to the individual dignity and self·respect. 
They may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their 
command at naught." (Jackson, J., dissenting in Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145, 197, 198 [67 S.Ot. 1098, 91 L.Ed 13991; see also United 
State8 v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 f68 S.Ot. 222, 92 L.Ed 210].) 
-Legislation has recently been enacted in Texas (Acts 1953, 53d Leg., 
p. 669, eh. 253, § I: Code Crim. Proc. 727a), North 0arolina (Stats. 
]951, ch. 644, § 1: Gen. Stats. §§ 15·27) and Maryland (Stats. 1947, 
ch. 752, p. 1849: Stats. 1951, chs. 145, 704, 710; Rtnts. 1952. ch. 59; 
Md. Ann. Code, §§ 5, 5A (limited to miBdemeanGl cases», prohibiting 
the use of illegall¥ obtained evidence. 
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applies to the states through the Fourteenth does not require 
states like California that have heretofore admitted illegally 
seized evidence to exclude it now. The exclusionary rule is 
not" an essential ingredient" of the right of privacy guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment, but simply a means of 
enforcing that right, which the states can accept or reject: 
"Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may 
be am effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is 
not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal 
standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's re-
liance upon other methods which if consistently enforced 
would be equally effective." (Italics added. Wolf v. Oolorado, 
supra, 338 U.S. 25 at p. 31.) The court did not state that the 
other methods of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures 
must be "consistently enforced" and be "equally effective." 
Except in extreme cases (see Rochin v. Oalifornia, 342 U.S. 
165 [72 8.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]), it is 
apparently willing to leave the matter of deterring unreason-
able searches and seizures by state officers entirely to the 
states and is not yet ready to condemn methods other than 
the exclusion of the evidence as falling below "minimal 
standards" even though the state makes no effort whatever 
to enforce them and in practical effect, therefore, has no 
method of making this basic constitutional guarantee effec-
tive. It would appear, therefore, that despite earlier state-
ments of the United States Supreme Court that the Fourth 
or the Fifth Amendment barred the use of evidence obtained 
through an illegal search and seizure (Go1tled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298, 311-313 [41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647]; Amos 
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-316 [41 8. Ct. 266, 65 
L.Ed. 654] ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392 
[34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652]), "the federal exclusionary 
rule," in the words of Mr. Justice Black, "is not a command 
of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of 
evidence which Congress might negate." (Concurring opin-
ion in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, at 39-40; see also 
Irvine v. Californw, 347 U.S. 128, 135 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 
561].) It would seem that it is also a rule that Congress 
could make binding on the states to deter state invasions of 
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee, which is now recognized 
as limiting state as well as federal action. (Cf., Civil Rights 
Act, Rev. Stats. § 1979, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 241, 242; Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 [71 8.Ct. 
576, 95 L.Ed. 774]; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 
) 
) 
) 
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[65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495] ; see also Stefanelli v. Minard, 
342 U.S. 117, 120-121 [72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138].) 
The rule of the Wolf case that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained by 
an unreasonable search and seizure was reaffirmed recently 
in Irvine v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 
561]. The decision, as in the Wolf case, was by a divided 
court. Justice Douglas dissented as he did in the Wolf case, 
and Justice Clark declared: "Had I been here in 1949 when 
Wolf was decided I would have applied the doctrine of 
Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383 [34 S.Ct. 341, 
58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834], to the states. But the court 
refused to do so then, and it still refuses today. Thus Wolf 
remains the law and, as such, is entitled to the respect of 
this Court's membership ..•• Perhaps strict adherence to 
the tenor of that decision may produce needed converts for 
its extinction." Justices Frankfurter and Burton, who were 
among the majority in the Wolf case, would hold that the 
methods employed in the Irvine case are so repulsive that 
evidence so obtained must be excluded as a matter of due 
process of law. Not only was the court closely divided, but 
Justice Jackson felt it appropriate to declare for the majority: 
"Now that the Wolf doctrine [the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth] is known to them, 
state courts may wish further to reconsider their evidentiary 
~ules. But to upset state convictions even before the states 
have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the [ ex-
clusionary] rule would be an unwarranted nse of federal 
power." (347 U.S. at p. 134.) Thus, after states that rely 
on methods other than the exclusionary rule to deter un-
reasonable searches and seizures have had an opportunity to 
reconsider their rules in the light of the Wolf doctrine, the 
way is left open for the United States Supreme Court to 
conclude that if these other methods are not C C consistently 
enforced" and are therefore not "equally effective" (see 
Wolf v. Oolorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 31), the "minimal 
standards" of due process have not been met.· 
*The Wolf and Irvine cases would then be brought into line with the 
eases holding coerced confessions inadmissible. (Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 
556 [74 S.Ct. 716, 9S L.Ed. 948]; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 
[69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801]; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 
601 [68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224): Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 
[65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029]; A.shcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 
[64 S.Ot. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192].) It is now settled that Buell confusions 
) 
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Meanwhile, pursuant to the suggestion of the United States 
Supreme Court, we have reconsidered the rule we have here-
tofore followed that the unconstitutional methods by which 
evidence is obtained does not affect its admissibility and 
have carefully weighed the various arguments that have been 
advanced for and against that rule. It bears emphasis that 
in the absence of a holding by the United States Supreme 
Court that the due process clause requires exclusion of un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, whatever rule we adopt, 
whether it excludes or admits the evidence, will be a judicially 
declared rule of evidence. (See MacNabb v. United States, 
318 U.S. 332, 341 [63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819]; On Lee v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 756 [72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270].) 
The rule admitting the evidence has been strongly sup-
ported by both scholars and judges.· Their arguments may 
be briefly summarized as follows: 
The rules of evidence are designed to enable courts to 
reach the truth and, in criminal cases, to secure a fair trial 
are excluded, not because they may lack evidential trustworthiness (" a 
coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even 
though statements in it may be independently established as true." 
Watts v. Indiana, supra, 338 U.S. 49, 50; see also Stroble v. California, 
343 U.S. 181, 190 [72 S.Ot. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872]), but because of the 
manner in which they arc ohtained. (See McCormick. Developments in 
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex.L.Rev. 239, 245.) Lawlessness 
of state officials in obtaining evidence is common to both coerced con-
fessions and unreasonable searches and seizures. Illegality, alone, of the 
means of getting confessions ('an not be the reason the Due Proeess 
Clause eompels their exclusion, for consistency would demand exelusion 
of evidence obtained by unreasoll:lule searches and seizures. The dif-
ferenee in treatment of these two problems may arise from the fact that 
ordinarily eoerced confessions are associated with physical coercion 
against the defendant's person. This element is usually not present in 
cases of unreasonable searches and seizures, (bnt see Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ot. 205, 96 L.Ed 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]) which 
may involve only minor intrusions of privacy or result from good· 
faith mistakes of judgment on the part of police officers. There is no 
reason, of course, why, if the exclusionary rule is adopted, appropriate 
exceptions could not be developed to govern these latter situations. On 
the other hand, deliberate, flagrant violations of the constitutional guar· 
antees like those in the present case and in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 
128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], may be as dangerous to ordered lib· 
erty as the coercion of confessions. (See Allen, Due Process and Stat~ 
Criminal Procedures, 48 Nw.L.Rev. 16, 26·27.) 
"See 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.l ~ 2184; Waite, Police Regula.-
tions by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich.L.Rev. 679; Ramo, Evidence Ob-
tained by III e.r; a I Search and Sei::ure, 10 m.L.Rev. 303; Grant, Cir-
cumventing the It'ollrtll A mend !Ilent, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 359; Grant, 
Illegally Seized Eviilence, 15 So.CaI.L.Rev. 60; Grant, Search and 
Seizure in California, Hi So.CaI.L.Rev. 139; Plumb, Illegal Enforce-
ment of the Law, 24 Corn.L.Q. 337; Judge Cardozo's opinion in 
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 r 1;)0 N.E. 585. 44 A.LA 510}. ia perhaps 
Ule beat jadicial defense of this position. 
) 
\ 
! 
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to those accused of crime. Evidence obtained by an illegal 
search and seizure is ordinarily just as true and reliable as 
evidence lawfully obtained. The court needs a11 reliable evi-
dence material to the issue before it, the guilt or innocence 
of the accused, and how such evidence is obtained is imma-
terial to that issue. It should not be excluded unless strong 
considerations of public policy demand it. There are no such 
considerations. 
Exclusion of the evidence cannot be justified as affording 
protection or recompense to the defendant or punishment to 
the officers for the illegal search and seizure. It does not 
protect the defendant from the search and seizure, since that 
illegal act has already occurred. If he is innocent or if there 
is ample evidence to convict him without the illegally obtained 
evidence, exclusion of the evidence gives him no remedy at 
all. Thus the only defendants who benefit by the exclusionary 
rule are those criminals who could not be convicted without 
the illegally obtained evidence. Allowing such criminals to 
escape punishment is not appropriate recompense for the in-
vasion of their co)'stitutional rights; it does not punish the 
officers who violated the constitutional provisions; and it fails 
to protect society from known criminals who should not be 
left at large. For his crime the defendant should be punished. 
For his violation of the constitutional provisions the offending 
officer should be punished. As the exclusionary rule operates, 
however, the defendant's crime and the officer's flouting of 
constitutional guarantees both go unpunished. "The criminal 
is to go free because the constable has blundered" (Cardozo, 
J., in People v. Defore, supra, 242 N.Y. 13, 21), and "Society 
is deprived of its remedy against one lawbreaker, because 
he has been pursued by another." (Jackson, J., in Irvine 
v. Oalifornia, supra, 347 U.S. 128, at 136; see also 8 Wigmore 
on Evidence [3d ed.] § 2184, p. 40.) 
Opponents of the exclusionary rule also point out that it 
is inconsistent with the rule allowing private litigants to 
use illegally obtained evidence (see Munson v. Munson, 27 
Ca1.2d 659, 664 [166 P.2d 268] ; Oil Workers Intl. Union v. 
SupM"ior Court, 103 Ca1.App.2d 512, 579-580 [230 P.2d 71] ; 
cf., Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Ca1.2d 399, 412 [49 P.2d 832]), 
and that as applied in the federal courts, it is capricious in 
its operation, either going too far or not far enough. "[ S] 0 
many exceptions to [the exclusionary] rule have been granted 
the judicial blessing as largely to destroy any value it might 
otherwise have had. Instead of adding to the aeeurity of 
) 
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legitimate individual rights, its principal contribution has 
been to add further technicalities to the law of criminal 
procedure. A district attorney who is willing to pay the price 
may easily circumvent its limitations. And the price to be 
paid is by no means high. " (Grant, Circumventing the Fourth 
Amendment, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 359.) Thus, the rule as applied 
in the federal courts has been held to protect only defendants 
whose own rights have been invaded by federal officers. If 
the illegal search and seizure havt> been conducted by a state 
officer or a private person not acting in cooperation with 
federal officers, or if the property seized is not defendant's 
the rule does not apply. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465 [41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 1:-1 A.L.R. 1159] ; Lustig v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 r 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 
1819] ; Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629; Kelley v. United 
States, 61 F.2d 843; Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268; 
Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615; United States v. Stirs-
man, 212 F.2d 900; cf. Gambino v. United States, 274 U.S. 310 
[48 8.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293, 52 A.L.R. 1381].)· 
Finally it has been pointed out that there is no convincing 
evidence that the exclusionary rule actually tends to prevent 
unreasonable searches and seizures (see Comment, 47 Nw. 
L.Rev. 493, 497; cf. Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. I, 20; 
42 Cal.L.Rev. 120) and that the" disciplinary or educational 
effect of the court's releasing the defendant for police mis-
behavior is so indirect as to be no more than 8 mild deterrent 
·Since it was determined in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25. 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibitions are applicable to state officers, 
it D1ay be that evidence secured illegally by state officers is no longer 
admissible in federal courts. (See Murphy, J., concurring in Lust'ig v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 74, at p. 80 rfl98 Ct. 1372,93 L.Ed. 1819]. "In 
my opinion the important consideration is the presence of an illegal 
search. Whether state or federal officers did the searching is of no 
consequence to the defendant and it should make no difference to us." 
See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ot. 191, 
93 L.Ed. 153]; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 [72 S.Ot. 93, 96 
L.Ed. 59]; Allen, The Wolf Case. 45 m.L.Rev. 1, 24.) 
A distinction with respect to evidence illegally obtained by private 
individuals may be justified by the fact that the constitutional pro-
visions only proscribe governmental action. ' 'It is one thing for the 
government to take advantage of information which one wrongdoer re-
veals of another, or the revelations which ensue when thieves fall out, 
and quite another thing for the government to condone or t>/lcourage a 
violation of the law by officers sworD to observe and enforce the law. 
If peace officers are rewarded for breaching the peace, what more 
potent influence could induce people generally to hold the law in con-
tempt and to break through lega] barriers whirh stand across the path 
ot their desires I JJ (State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 377 r2;39 S.W. 100. 
3! A.L.B. 383]; see also Allen, The Woll Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. 1. 23.) 
-) 
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at best." (Jackson, J., in b'vme v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128, 
at pp. 136-137 [78 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].) 
[7] Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing argu-
ments, we have concluded, as Justice Carter and Justice 
Schauer have consistently maintained,· that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inad-
missible. People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517]; 
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], 
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled. t We 
have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other 
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the 
constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with 
the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have 
been constantly required to participate in, and in effect con-
done, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers. 
When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an 
illegal search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at 
a trial, the success of the lawless venture depends entirely 
on the court's lending its aid by allowing the evidence to 
be introduced. It is no answer to say that a distinction 
should be drawn between the government acting as law en-
forcer and the gatherer of evidence and the government 
acting as judge. "[N] 0 distinction can be taken between the 
Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If 
the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have 
a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge 
to allow such iniquities to succeed." (Holmes, J., dissenting 
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 [48 8. Ct. 564, 
72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376].) Out of regard for its own 
dignity as an agency of justice and custodian of liberty the 
court should not have a hand in such "dirty business." (See 
MacNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 [63 8. Ct. 608, 
87 L.Ed. 819].) Courts refuse their aid in civil cases to 
·See dissenting opinions in People v. Gonzales, 20 CaUd 165 [124 P.2d 
44]: People v. KeTley, 22 Ca1.2d 169 [137 P.2d 11; People v. Hockin, 
101 Cal.App.2d 140, 143, 149 [225 P.2d I, 913]; reversed by United 
States Supreme Court, Rockin v. Oalifornia, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 
96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]); 1ft re Dixon, 41 CaUd 756, 764 
[264 P.2d 513]. 
fll [S]inee experience is of all teaehers the most dependable, and 
Binee experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of 
evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth 
should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that 
experience bas clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old 
rule." (Sutherland, J., in Funk v. United Statu. 290 U.s. 371,381 [54 
8..Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed 369, 93 A.L.R. 1136].) 
... 
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prevent the consummation of illegal schemeR of private liti-
gants (Lee On v. Long, 37 Ca1.2d 499, 502-503 [234 P.2d 9], 
and cases cited) ; a fortiori, they should not extend that aid 
and thereby permit the consummation of illegal schemes of 
the state itself. (See Roberts, J., concurring in Sorells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 [53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 
86 A.L.R. 249].) It is morally incongruous for the state to 
flout constitutional rights and at the same time demand that 
its citizens observe the law. The end that the state seeks 
may be a laudable one, but it no more justifies unlawful acts 
than a laudable end justifies unlawful action by any member 
of the public. Moreover, any process of law that sanctions 
the imposition of penalties upon an individual through the 
use of the fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction 
of the whole system of restraints on the exercise of the public 
force that are inherent in the "concept of ordered liberty." 
(See Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. 1, 20.) "Decency, 
security, and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are 
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence 
of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law, 
it invites everyman to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction 
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. 
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely 
sct its face." (Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 
A.L.R. 376] ; see also State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 377 [259 
S.W. 100, 32 A.L.R. 383] ; Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43 [94 
So. 329, 332] ; Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152 [224 
S.\V. 860, 866, 13 A.L.R. 1303] ; State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 
43 [254 P. 788, 792] ; State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619 [234 N.W. 
610,613].) 
If the unconstitutional conduct of the law enforcement 
officers were more flagrant or more closely connected with 
the conduct of the trial, it is clear that the foregoing principles 
would compel the rcversal of any conviction based thereon. 
Thus, no matter how guilty a defendant might be or how 
\ 
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outrageous his crime, he must not be deprived of a fair trial, 
and any action, official or otherwise, that would have that 
effect would not be tolerated. Similarly, he may not be con-
victed on the basis of evidence obtained by the use of the 
rack or the screw or other brutal means no matter how 
reliable the evidence obtained may be. (Roe-kin v. California, 
supra, 342 U.S. 165.) Today one of the foremost public 
concerns is the police state, and recent history has demon-
strated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless 
although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out 
of human rights. This peril has been recognized and dealt 
with when its challenge has been obvious; it cannot be for-
gotten when it strikes further from the courtroom by invading 
the privacy of homes. 
If the unconstitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures are to have significance they must be 
enforced, and if courts are to discharge their duty to support 
the state and federal Constitutions they must be willing to aid 
in their enforcement If those guarantees were being ef-
fectively enforced by other means than excluding evidence ob-
tained by their violation, a different problem would be pre-
sented. If such were the case there would be more force to 
the argument that a particular criminal should not be re-
dressed for a past violation of his rights by excluding the 
evidence against him. Experience has demonstrated, how-
ever, that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies 
are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The 
innocent suffer with the gulity, and we cannot close our eyes 
to the effect the rule we adopt will have on the rights of those 
not before the court. "Alternatives [to the exclusionary rule] 
are deceptive. Their very -statement conveys the impression 
that one possibility is as effective as the next. For there is but 
one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction 
at all." (Murphy, J., dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 
338 U.S. 25, 41; see also / Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 393 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834J.) 
"The difficulty with [other remedies] is in part due to the 
failure of interested parties to inform of the offense. No 
matter what an illegal raid turns up, police are unlikely to 
inform on themselves or each other.. If it turns up nothing 
incriminating, the innocent victim usually does not care to 
take steps which will air the fact that he has been under suspi-
cion." (Jackson, J., in Irvine v. California, supra, 347 U.S. 
l28, 137.) Moreover, even when it becomes "enerali1 iwown 
) 
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that the pollee conduct illegal searches and seizures, publie 
opinion is not aroused as it is in the case of other violations of 
constitutional rights. Illegal searches and seizures lack the 
obvious brutality of coerced confessions and the third degree 
and do not so clearly strike at the very basis of our civil lib-
erties as do unfair trials or the lynching of even an admitted 
murderer. "Freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, easily 
summon powerful support against encroachment. The pro-
hibition against unreasonable search and seizure is normally 
invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have few 
friends." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United 
Btates, 331 U.S. 145, 156 [67 8. Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399].) 
There is thus all the more necessity for courts to be vigilant in 
protecting these constitutional rights if they are to be pro-
tected at all. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 
A.L.R. 1383], was decided over thirty years ago. Since then 
case after case has appeared in our appellate reports describing 
unlawful searches and seizures against the defendant on trial, 
and those CWiles undoubtedly reflect only a small fraction of 
the violations of the constitutional provisions that have ac-
tually occurred. On the other hand, reported cases involving 
civil actions against police officers are rare, and those involv-
ing successful criminal prosecutions against officers are non-
existent. In short, the constitutional provisions are not being 
enforced. 
Granted that the adoption of the exclusionary rule will not 
prevent all illegal searches and seizures, it will discourage 
them. Police officers and prosecuting officials are primarily 
interested in convicting criminals. Given the exclusionary 
rule and a choice between securing evidence by legal rather 
than illegal means, officers will be impelled to obey the law 
themselves since not to do so will jeopardize their objectives. 
Moreover, the same considerations that justify the privilege 
against self-incrimination are not irrelevant here. As Wig-
more pointed out, that privilege, just as the prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, is primarily for the pro-
tection of the innocent. "The real objection is that any 
system of administratio-n. which permits the prosecutio-n to 
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure tU a ,ouree of 
proof must itself morally suffer thereb-y. The inclination de-
velops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied 
with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The 
exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness 
of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peacef\ll 
) 
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process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying 
and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an 
answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected an-
swer,-that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate 
use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are 
jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems 
to have been the course of experience in those legal systems 
where the privilege was not recognized." (8 Wigmore on Evi-
dence [3d ed.] § 2251, p. 309.) [8] Similarly, a system that 
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence cannot help but encourage violations 
of the Constitution at the expense of lawful means of enforcing 
the law. (See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United 
States, s'upra, 331 U.S. 145, 172.) On the other hand, if courts 
respect the constitutional provisions by refusing to sanction 
their violation, they will not only command the respect of law-
abiding citizens for themselves adhering to the law, they will 
also arouse public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforce-
ment of the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law en-
forcement officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing 
them in lawless ways. 
It is contended, however, that the police do not always 
have a choice of securing evidence by legal means and that 
in many cases the criminal will escape if illegally obtained 
evidence cannot be used against him. This contention is not 
properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the con-
stitutional provisions themselves. It was rejected when those 
provisions were adopted. In such cases had the Constitution 
been obeyed, the criminal could in no event be convicted. 
He does not go free because the constable blundered, but 
because the Constitutions prohibit securing the evidence 
against him. Their very provisions contemplate that it is 
preferable that some criminals go free than that the right 
of privacy of all the people be set at naught. "It is vital, 
no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and that all 
relevant evidence should be secured and used. On the other 
hand, it cannot be said too often that what is involved far 
transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is 
involved than that which makes for an atmosphere of free-
dom as against a feeling of fear and repression for society 
as a whole." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United 
States, supra, 331 U.S. 145, 173.) The situation presented 
differs only in degree from otlier situations where the choice 
must be made between securing convictions by illegal means 
46 Clel II 
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or allowing criminals to go free. Cases undoubtedly arise 
where a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
a coerced confession, the testimony of defendant's spouse, a 
violation of the attorney-client privilege or other privileges 
is essential to the conviction of the criminal, but the choice has 
been made that he go unpunished. Arguments against the 
wisdom of these rights and privileges, just as arguments 
against the wisdom of the prohibitions against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, should be addressed to the question 
whether they should exist at all, but arguments against the 
wisdom of the constitutional provisions may not be invoked to 
justify a failure to enforce them while they remain the law 
of the land.· 
Weare not unmindful of the contention that the federal 
exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its application and 
has introduced needless confusion into the law of criminal 
procedure. The validity of this contention need not be con-
sidered now. Even if it is assumed that it is meritorious, it 
does not follow that the exclusionary rule should be rejected. 
[9] In developing a rule of evidence applicable in the state 
courts, this court is not bound by the decisions that have 
applied the federal rule, and if it appears that those decisions 
have developed needless refinements and distinctions, thi~ 
court need not follow them. Similarly, if the federal cases 
indicate needless limitations on the right to conduct reason-
." Finally, I have no fear that the exclusionary rule will handicap 
the detection or prosecution of crime. All the arguments that have been 
made on that score seem to me properly directed not against the ex· 
clusionary rule but against the substantive guarantee itself. The ex-
clusion of the evidence is the only sanction which makes the rule effective. 
It is the rule, not the sanction, which imposes limits on the operation of 
the police. It the rule is obeyed as it should be, and as we declare 
it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evidence to be excluded 
by the operation of the sanction. 
"It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on 
the ground that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge 
to the fundamental rules to which the police are required to conform. 
If those rules, defining the scope of the search which may be made 
without a warrant and the scope of a search under a warrant are sound, 
there is no reason why they should be violated or why a prosecuting at-
torney should seek to avail himself of the fruits of their violation. U 
those fundamental rules are open to challenge .... the burden is on 
those who challenge them to specify the modifications they deem to be 
desirable. I think that is a far better course than to object to the 
inclusion in this amendment of the one sanction which will give the 
constitutional provision, however it is defined, genuine meaning." Sena-
tor Robert F. Wagner speaking before the New York Constitutional 
Convention of 1938. (Record of the New York State Constitutional 
ConventiOIl ~g-540, reprinted in Allen, Xli_ Wolf CGu, 46 D1 Ie BeV. 
J.~. 
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able searches and seizures or to secure warrants, this court is 
free to reject them. Under these circumstances the adoption 
of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confusion into 
the law of criminal procedure. Instead it opens the door to 
the development of workable rules governing searches and 
seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect both 
the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and 
the interest of society in the suppression of crime. 
The orders are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The guilt of the appellant is clearly demonstrated by the 
record before us. (See People v. Ctikan, (Cal.App.) 274 P.2d 
724.) He and his numerous codefendants unquestionably 
engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy to commit innumerable 
violations of the laws of the State of California. Six of his 
codefendants pleaded guilty and seven others, in addition to 
appellant, were convicted upon the trial. We have before us 
solely the appeal of defendant Charles H. Cahan. 
Upon the trial, certain evidence was admitted over the 
objection that it had been illegally obtained. The learned trial 
judge, following precisely the non exclusionary rule which, 
until the filing of the majority opinion in this case, had been 
firmly established as the law of this state, admitted the evi-
dence over the objection. The non exclusionary rule had been 
enunciated by this court in the relatively early case of People 
v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517], and was reiterated 
in People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], 
after the United States Supreme Court had adopted the so-
called Weeks doctrine. (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 [34 8.0t. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834].) More 
recently, this court, in a well-reasoned opinion written by 
Mr. Justice Traynor in People v. Gonzales, 20 Ca1.2d 165 
[124 P.2d 44], again followed the nonexclusionary rule; and 
it similarly followed that rule in the later decisions of People 
v. Kelley, 22 Ca1.2d 169 [137 P.2d 1], and People v. Haeussler, 
41 Ca1.2d 252 [260 P .2d 8]. Consistent adherence to the non-
exclusionary rule has been further demonstrated by the denial 
of petitions for hearing by this court in numerous cases, only 
a few of which need be cited. (People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 
894 [153 P.2d 464] ; PeopLe v. One 1941 Mercur:t/ Sedan, 74 
) 
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Cal.App.2d 199 [168 P.2d 443J ; People v. Oreck, 74 Cal.App. 
2d 215 [168 P.2d 186] j People v. Tucker, 88 Cal.App.2d 333 
[198 P.2d 941] ; People v. Sica, 112 Cal.App.2d 574 [247 P.2d 
72]; People v. Allen, 115 Cal.App.2d 745 [252 P.2d 968].) 
A reading of the above-mentioned authorities shows that 
this court has previously considered practically every argu-
ment now advanced for the adoption of the so-called exclu-
sionary rule and has consistently determined that such argu-
ments were outweighed by those advanced in favor of the 
nonexclusionary rule. In adopting and adhering to the non·· 
exclusionary rule, the law of the State of California has 
thereby been kept in harmony with the law of the great 
majority of the other statcs and of all the British common-
wealths; as well as in line with the considered views of the 
majority of the most eminent legal scholars. Only the federal 
courts and the courts of a relatively few states have adopted 
the judicially created exclusionary rule. (See appendix to 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 [69 8.Ct. 1359,93 L.Ed. 1782].) 
It therefore appears that the great majority of the legal minds 
which have dealt with this problem have been in accord with 
the views expressed by our predecessors on this court and 
with the views expressed by the majority of the present mem-
bers of this court as declared in People v. Gonzales, supra, 
20 CaL2d 165, and our other recent decisions. But despite 
this gieat wealth of legal precedent pointing to the desira-
bility of the continuance of the nonexclusionary rule, the 
majority of this court now does a judicial turnabout and 
declares that" People v. Le DOllX, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517], 
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], 
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled." This 
is a forthright declaration but, with all due deference to the 
views of the majority, I cannot join in it. 
I agree with the majority that " ... in the absence of 
a holding by the United States Supreme Court that the due 
process clause requires exclusion of unconstitutionally ob-
tained eviuence, whatever rule we adopt, whether it excludes 
or admits the evidence, will be a judicially declared rule of 
eviucnce." 1.'he United Slat(·s Supreme Court has never held 
that the due process clause requires such exclusion but, on 
the contrary, has indicated that the federal exclusionary rule 
"iB a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might 
negate." (Concurring opinion of Black, J., in Wolf v. Colo-
rado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 40.) California, in line with the 
great weight of authodty, has always applied the nonexclu-
) 
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sionary rule, and if there is any virtue in the doctrine of 
stare decisis, this court should 110t overturn this firmly estab-
lished rule in the absence of compelling reasons for such 
change. The difference in point of view stems from the fact 
that the majority apparently have found compelling reasons 
for such change while I have not. 
If the question were an open one in this state, I would still 
be of the opinion that the non exclusionary rule should be 
judicially declared to be the rule in California. The expres-
sion of this view does not signify that I condone any illegal 
search or seizure by any enforcement officer-federal, state 
or local-or by any other person. On the contrary, the consti-
tutional and statutory rights of every citizen should be 
respected and protected. The law of this state provides both 
criminal sanctions (Pen. Code, § 146) and civil remedies for 
the violations of such rights; and it has been declared that 
the federal statutes cover violations by any person of the 
federal constitutional provisions. (Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128, 138 [74 8.0t. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].) Hence, the main 
question presented in criminal proceedings of this nature is 
whether the exclusionary rule, in the light of such relative 
advantages and disadvantages which may result from its 
adoption, should be preferred to the non exclusionary rule. 
In determining this question we may well consider the experi-
ence under the federal rule. 
Tile experience of the federal courts in attempting to apply 
the exclusionary rule does not appear to commend its adoption 
elsewhere. The spectacle of an obviously guilty defendant 
obtaining a favorable ruling by a court upon a motion to 
suppress evidence or upon an objection to evidence, and 
thereby, in effect, obtaining immunity from any successful 
prosecution of the charge against him, is a picture which has 
been too often seen in the federal practice. In speaking of 
an obviously gUilty defendant, I refer by way of example 
to one from whose home has been taken large quantities of 
contraband, consisting of narcotics or other commodities, the 
very possession of which constitutes a serious violation of the 
law. The above..:mentioned result, however, is the inevitable 
consequence of the application of the federal exclusionary rule 
in those cases in which it may be ultimately determined tluLt 
a search or seizure has been made illegally, either because of 
the absence of a search warrant or because of some technical 
defect in the affidavit upon which the warrant was based. 
Furthermore, under the present federal practice, the trial 
I 
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of the accused is interrupted to try the question of whether 
the evidence was in fact illegally obtained. This question is 
often a delicate one, and the main trial is at least delayed 
while the question of whether some other person has com~ 
mitted a wrong in obtaining the evidence has been judicially 
determined; and if the claim of the accused is sustained, the 
prosecution of the case against the accused, regardless of the 
fact that his guilt may appear clear, is often frustrated. The 
delicacy of the question results from the fact that there is still 
great uncertainty in the law as to the precise circumstances 
which will render a search or seizure "unreasonable," and as 
to the precise nature of the defects in the affidavit which will 
render invalid a search wal'rant. 
It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate all the argu-
ments which have been advanced against the adoption of the 
exclusionary rule. They have been set forth in numerous 
authorities cited in the majority opinion in the present case 
and in the appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25. 
With commendable frankness, many of these arguments are 
summarized in the majority opinion here. They were discussed 
extensively in a learned opinion by Justice Cardozo in People 
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 [150 N.E. 585, 44 A.L.R. 510], where 
the court unanimously decided against its adoption. And 
while it may be an overstatement to say, as does Dean Wig-
more, that the exclusion of such evidence is based upon "mis-
guided sentimentality" (Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 
VIII, § 2184, p. 36), it is significant that this learned writer 
should have felt impelled to make such statement. The fact 
is that the courts have been put to a difficult choice, but there 
is no doubt that the great majority of eourts have determined 
that the cost of the adoption of the exclusionary rule is too 
great when compared t~ the relatively little good that it can 
accomplish. 
The only new argument for the adoption of the exclusionary 
rule is based upon the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court has again spoken on the subject in Irvine v. Oalifornia, 
supra, 347 U.S. 128. There the court was again divided, with 
the dissenting justices, under the particular facts of that case, 
advocating a reversal but with no unanimity as to the reasons 
for such reversal. The majority nevertheless affirmed the 
judgment of conviction and sustained the rule of Wolf v. Colo-
rado, supra, 338 U.S. 25. While arguments in favor of any 
approach to the problem there presented may be found in 
the opinwD.lil of the several justices, I find nothing in the maiD 
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opinion which would indicate the compulsion for, or desira-
bility of, a change in the established rule in the state. On 
the contrary, I find statements in the main opinion which give 
cogent reasons for adhering to the nonexclusionary rule. 
In the Irvine case, the main opinion states at page 134: 
"The chief burden of administering criminal justice rests 
upon state courts. To impose upon them the hazard of federal 
reversal for non-compliance with standards as to which this 
Court and its members have been so inconstant and inconsis-
tent would not be justified. We adhere to Wolf as stating 
the law of search-and-seizure cases and decline to introduce 
vague and subjective distinctions." 
Again on pages 136 and 137, it is said in the main Irvine 
opinion: "It must be remembered that petitioner is not invok-
ing the Constitution to prevent 01' punish a violation of his 
federal right recognized in Wolf or to recover reparations for 
the violation. He is invoking it only to set aside his own 
conviction of crime. That the rule of exclusion and reversal 
results in the escape of guilty persons is more capable of 
demonstration than that it deters invasions of right by the 
police. The case is made, so far as the police are concerned, 
when they announce that they have arrested their man. Rejec-
tion of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing 
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing 
defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one law-
breaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects 
one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but 
does n~hing to protect innocent persons who are the victims 
of illegal but fruitless searches. The disciplinary or educa-
tional effect of the court's releasing the defendant for police 
misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a mild deter-
rent at best. Some discretion is still left to the states in crim-
inal cases, for which they are largely responsible, and we think 
it is for tht!m to determine which rule best serves them." 
The above-quoted language from the main opinion in the 
Irvine case shows that there is relatively little to be said in 
favor of the exclusionary rule. If that rule is "no more than 
a mild deterrent at best" and if'" It deprives society of its 
remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued 
by another," it seems clear that little good and much harm 
can come from its adoption. The above-quoted language also 
shows that this court is under no compulsion to reverse its 
former holdings and to adopt the federal exclusionary rule. 
Furthermore, I cannot ascertain from the majority opinion 
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in the present case the nature of the rule which is being 
adopted to supplant the well established nonexclusionary rule 
in California. Is it the exclusionary rule as interpreted in 
the federal courts with all its technical distinctions, excep-
tions, and qualifications and embracing "standards to which 
[the United States Supreme] Court and its members have been 
so inconstant and inconsistent." (Irvine v. Oalifornia, supra, 
347 U.S. 128, 134.) Apparently not, for the majority opinion 
here assumes the validity of the contention that "the federal 
exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its application and 
has introduced needless confusion into the law of criminal pro-
cedure. " But after making passing reference to possible 
"needless refinements and distinctions" and "needless limita-
tions" found in the federal cases, the majority declares that 
this court is free to reject the rules established by such cases, 
and it concludes as follows: " Under these circumstances, the 
adoption of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confu-
sion into the law of criminal procedure. Instead it opens the 
door to the development of workable rules governing searches 
and seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect 
both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions 
and the interest of society in the suppression of crime." 
The majority does not suggest what these "workable rules" 
may be nor how "confusion" may be avoided. Neither the 
federal courts nor the courts of any of the few states which 
adopted the exclusionary rule have apparently found a satis-
factory solution to this problem of developing "workable 
rules, " and it seems impossible to contemplate the possibility 
that this court can develop a satisfactory solution. At best, 
this court would have to work out such rules in piecemeal 
fashion as each case might come before it. In the meantime, 
what rules are to guide our trial courts in the handling of 
their problems f If the nonexclusionary rule can be said to 
have one unquestioned advantage, it is the advantage of 
certainty. On the other hand, it appears that the exclusionary 
rule, in the many ramifications of its application to innumer-
able factual situations, is fraught with such difficulty as to 
make the formation of satisfactory, certain and workable rules 
a practical impossibility. 
Much of the above discussion has been directed to the un-
desirability of adopting the exclusionary rule if the question 
were a novel one in this state. Of course, the question is not a 
novel one, for the numerous decisions show that this state had 
heretofore adopted a fixed and consistent policy on the &ubject. 
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I find nothing that has occurred since the recent decisions of 
this court in People v. Gonzales, supra, 20 Ca1.2d 165, People 
v. Kelley, supra, 22 Ca1.2d 169, and People v. Haeussler, 
supra, 41 Ca1.2d. 252, to furnish compelling reasons for this 
court to enunciate a change of that policy. 
If, however, reasons may be said to exist for a change in the 
established policy of this state, I believe that the Legislature, 
rather than the courts, should make such change. This is 
particularly true in a situation such as the present one, when 
the change of policy should be accompanied by "workable 
rules" to implement such change. Otherwise, this court, by 
the sweeping repudiation of its past decisions, launches the 
administration of justice upon an uncharted course which the 
trial courts will find great difficulty in following. In this 
connection, it is worthy of note that bills have frequently been 
introduced in the Legislature to accomplish precisely that 
which is accomplished by the majority opinion, to wit: the 
supplanting of the nonexclusionary rule by the so-called ex-
clusionary rule, without prescribing any" workable rules" for 
the latter's application. In the recent legislative sessions of 
1951 (see Senate Bill No. 1689 and Assembly Bill No. 3120) 
and of 1953 (see Assembly Bills Nos. 2896 and 3126), such 
bills have been introduced but none has ever been brought to 
a vote in either house. Under the circumstances, it would be 
far better for this court to allow the Legislature to deal with 
this question of policy, for the Legislature could accompany 
any desired change with needed legislation establishing the 
rules to guide our courts in the application of the new 
policy. 
Returning to the precise situation presented by the record 
before us, it may be conceded that the illegality in obtaining 
the evidence was both clear and flagrant. It may be further 
conceded that the crimes which defendants conspired to com-
mit were not in the class of the more serious public offenses. 
The fact remains, however, that the exclusionary rule, as 
adopted by the majority, is a rule for all cases and that it de-
prives society of its remedy against the most desperate gang-
ster charged with the most heinous crime merely because of 
some degree of illegality in obtaining the evidence against him. 
Thus, it appears that the main beneficiaries of the adoption of 
the exclusionary rule will be those members of the under-
world who prey upon law-abiding citizens through their crimi-
nal activities. It further appears that the adoption of the 
exclusionary rule will inevitably lead to unnecessary con-
J 
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fusion, delay and inefficiency in the administration of justice. 
Such is the price that society must pay for the adoption of the 
exclusionary rule, a rule of uncertain nature and doubtful 
value which is "no more than a mild deterrent at best." 
In my opinion, the cost of the adoption of the exclusionary 
rule is manifestly too great. It would be far better for this 
state to adhere to the nonexclusionary rule, and to reexamine 
its laws concerning the sanctions to be placed upon illegal 
searches and seizures. If the present laws are deemed inade-
quate to discourage illegal practices by enforcement officers, 
the Legislature might well consider the imposition of civil 
liability for such conduct upon the governmental unit employ-
ing the offending officer, in addition to the liability now im-
posed upon the officer himself. It might also consider fixing a 
minimum amount to be recovered as damages in the same man-
ner that a minimum has been fixed for the invasion of other 
civil rights. (Civ. Code, § 52.) These methods would be far 
more effective in discouraging illegal activities on the part of 
enforcement officers and such methods would not be subject to 
the objection, inherent in the adoption of the exclusionary 
rule, that "It deprives society of its remedy against one law-
breaker because he has been pursued by another." (Irvine v. 
California, supra, 347 U.S. 128, 136.) 
In my opinion, we should adhere to our prior decisions and 
affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 25, 
1955. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
